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lheir risk ossets porticulorly towords the reol seclor when investments in
government popers become less profiioble. This behoviour by the bonks will
definitely limit lhe poiency of monetory policy lo couse chonges in the reol
economy. Consequenlly, lhis speciol role of bonks hod been sludied extensively
both ot the theoreticol ond empiricol levels.
As hod been submilled olreody, DMBS oller their lending behoviour in

o specific
policy.
poriiculor
woy following o chonge in monelory
Of
inleresl, o chonge in
monetory policy rote offecls lending behoviour, risk{oking oppetite ond to o
lorge extent lhe profitobility of bonks, oll of which hove importont implicotions for
ihe entire economy. Using oggregote lime series doto on bonk lending in
response to chonges in monetory policy, this study investigoles lhe dynomic
relolionship between lhe oclions of ihe Centrol Bonk of Nigerio, lhrough chonges
in the monetory policy role (MPR). ond lhe behoviour of deposit money bonks ln
Nigerio in lerms of ollocotion ond pricing of credit. The lmpulse Response
Function onolysis (lRF) shows thol o shock to the monetory policy induces o slight
positive effect on credit lo the privole seclor, o situotion which lend to fizle out
ofter the thkd month. A similor shock lo the MPR however, shows on initiol slight
negolive effect on the moximum lending rote which quickly chonged to positive
ond rose significontly ond persislently.
The rest of this poper is orgonised os follows. Section 2 provides some lheorelicol

ond empiricol literolure obout the relotionship between monelory policy ond
bonk behoviour. Seclion 3 discusses the monetory policy fromework in Nigerio,
onolysing policy insiruments, moneiory policy fromework under vorious regimes
ond the outcomes. Section 4 describes lhe economelric onolysis ond Section 5
presents lhe empiricol results. Finolly, Section 6 summorizes the poper ond offers
some odvice for policy direclions.

ll.
ll. t

Review of Llleroture

Theorellcol Fromework

The monner in which bonks behove when the cenkol bonk chonges its monetory
policy stonce is entrenched in the ironsmission mechonism of monetory policy.
The tronsmission mechonism is usuolly described os the chonnels through which

initiol decisions or chonges in ony monelory policy instrument (policy vorioble)
impocts the ultimote gool of monetory policy including inveslmenl, inflotion,
outpui, etc. The moior chonnels lhot hove been idenlified in the lileroture include
the bonk lending, interest rote, exchonge rote ond the osset price chonnels.
ll is unorguoble lhot bonks ploy o pivotol role in the efficocy of monelory policy.
This becomes cleor when one considers lhol bonks ore directly or indirectly
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involved in eoch of lhe chonnels of monetory policy tronsmission. For instonce,
becouse bonks ploy o key role in internolionol irode, chonges in monetory policy
thot offecls the exchonge rote creotes o conesponding reoclion in bonks'
behoviours. Similody, when lhe monetory outhorilies chonge the direclion of
monetory policy thot offects the quontum of money supply or the rote of inleresl,
bonks generolly reocl by ollering their portfolios of investments in order to
moximize lheir returns. ln effect, bonks serve os conduit for the delivery of lhe
objectives of policy.
The impoct of monetory policy chonges on bonk behoviours con be studied
using the bonk lending chonnel of monelory policy lronsmission mechonism. The
Iending chonnel usuolly emphosizes the effect thol chonges in monetory policy
hos on bonks' bolonce sheel in the presence of cerloin dislortions. li stotes thol in
the presence of copitol morket imperfections {os is lhe cose in developing
countries like Nigerio), whenever there is o decline in deposit liobilities, bonks moy
find it difficull to substitute with other forms of finoncing such os equity or debt.
Thus, o monetory policy controction lhol lowers bonks' deposils moy leod 1o o
reduclion in lhe ovoiloble loonoble funds oi thek disposol, evenluolly offecting
credil ovoilobility lo the privole secior. This in tum lronsloles io o foll in inveslment
ond output.

o convenient woy of sludying this
ond LM equotions describe lhe goods ond money morkets

The IS-LM fromework con become
tronsmission2. The lS

equilibrium:
Consider lhe
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t)I

= interesl rote

b = interesl response of inveslment
c = morginol propensity lo consume

t

= tox

role

fr /F = reot money suppty
k = sensitivity of reol money bolonces to the level of income
h = sensitivity of reol money bolonces to the level of interest rote

k,h,c,t,b >

0

Al equilibrium. both the goods ond the money mokets intersecl. To derive this
position, we substitute equolion 2 into I ond solve for the equilibrium level of
oulput.
Substituting 2 into l, we get

r=

b/
M\
aote- n[kY - :11
P/'

And reorronging terms, we obtoin the equilibrium oulput

y"= yV+

rll

{3)

Where

f = ae /(l+

ka6b/h)

Now substiluling equolion 3 into 2, we finolly obloin the equilibrium interest role
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Equotion 4 shows thol o monetory impulse represented by lhe money supply
vorioble hos on impocl on the interest role.
Overoll, o generol consensus in the lileroture, especiolly in the losl two ond holt
decodes which hos focused lorgely. on mocroeconomic evidence indicoles the
simplest implicotion for lending chonnel is thot bonk loons should be closely
coneloted with monelory policy meosures Bernonke ond Blinder (1988). ln o
different sludy Koshyop ond Stein (1993) found thot o tighl monelory policy moy
operote through stondord interest rote chonnels to depress economic oclivity
ond to reduce the demond for credit. Consequenlly, there con be on induced
conelolion between octivity ond bonk lending even il there is no lending
chonnel.

Rodrigo Alforo et ol. (2003) noted lhot lhe lronsmission mechonism process
begins with the monetory outhority setting the monetory policy rote, which
invoriobly leods to the regulotion of liquidity of the finonciol system through the
octivotion of differenl mechonisms in lhe tronsmission chonnel. The choin of
tronsmission is octivoted vio lhe convergence of inler-bonk roie which ultimotely
defines the interesl rote (cosl of copitol) with implicoiions for domestic oggregote
demond through o foll or rise in investmenl ond consumption of duroble goods.
Furthermore, the exchonge rote chonnel (in open economies) is octivoied
through the effect of lhe uncovered interest rote pority on net imports, while the
ossel price chonnel (slocks, bonds, ond reol stotes) is triggered vio the
generolion of o weolth effect thot hos on impocl on consumers' decisions.
However, in olher studies credit chonnel, which hos ossumed greoter importonce
in contemporory reseorch, hos been found to emphosize the role of osymmetric
informotion ond how the costly enforcement o, conlrocts creotes ogency
problems in finonciol morkets (Bernonke ond Gertler, 1995). Such studies odded
thot, two bosic chonnels, the trodilionol bonk lending chonnel ond the boloncesheet chonnel ore identified.
of bonks in the monetory tronsmission mechonism especiolly through ihe
bonk lending chonnel hos received wide promotion in the literoture in lhe lost
few decodes. The orguments hove been oround the foct lhol the osymmetry of
the loon response to policy, usuolly orose from differences in ihe strength of
bonks' bolonce sheel. ln olher words, bonk size determines the sensitiviiy of loons
The role

to

chonges

in

monetory policy such thot

the loon growth ol

smoll,

undercopitolized bonks is more responsive to chonges in monetory policy thon
loon growlh ol lqger ond betler-copitolized bonks (Kishon ond Opielo 2000). ln o
further study lo distinguish between ihe effects of exponsionory ond
conlroctionory policy on bonk loons for bonks of differeni sizes (Chong ond
Jonsen 2005) found evidence thol bonks ploy on importont role in ihe rhoneiory
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Overview of lhe Evolutlon of Monelory Pollcy Fromework ln Nlgerlo

Monetory Policy is the deliberole otlempl by the monetory oulhoriiy (like Cenkol
Bonk of Nigerio) to use monelory inslruments to influence the ovoilobility, supply
ond cost of credit in order to ochieve certoin overoll mocroeconomic ond
welfore objectives. The CBN hos the role os on institution of government to
conducl oppropriote monetory policy which is consislent overoll economic
objectives of policy mokers. Over time, the overoll obiective of monetory policy in
Nigerio os in mosi other iurisdiclions hos remoined the moinlenonce of
mocroeconomic stobility through the pursuit of price stobility. Specificolly,
monetory policy in Nigerio, from the eorly 1970's hos been designed 1o promote
not just price stobility but olso lo slimulote high rote of employment, suslenonce
of economic growth ond vioble bolonce of poymeni. ln ils most recent form, the
objeclives ol the notion's monetory policy hove olso included specific torgets of
sioble long{erm interest ond reol exchonge rotes. ln other words, os developing
economy. monelory policies in Nigerio hove o lorgely duol objective of price
slobility ond sustoinoble growth. However. while lhe obiectives hove remoined
relotively stoble, the implementotion process hos evolved over lime moving from
relionce on direct conlrols lo indirect controls.
ln oddition, the monetory policy regimes hove olso chonged over time 1o refleci

the odopted implementotion fromework by the monetory outhority. These
chonges which involved the odoption ond use of different strotegies ond
instrumenls were done to cope wilh the chonging finonciol ond generol
economic environmenl ot vorying period. Consequenlly, olong with the shifl from
dkect to indkeci (mokel-bosed) monetory monogemenl, the Cenirol Bonk of
Nigerio (CBN) hos implemented two mojor policy fromeworks involving exchonge
rote lorgeting (1959-,l973) ond monelory torgeting (1974 till dole). Focus hos olso
shifled owoy from short{erm towords o medium term time frome, mojorly lo free
lhe implementotion from the problem of time inconsislency.

lll.l

Objecllve(s)/Torget3 ond lnstrumenls of

l

onetory Pollcy

Prior to eorly 1990s, the CBN relied mojorly on o combinotion of

direcl inslruments
(credil ceilings, stobilisotion securities, sectorol credit ollocotion, inlerest controls
ond imposition of speciol deposils omong olhers) for the conducl of its monetory
policy operotions. Following wide spreod mocroeconomic reforms vorious
morket-bosed tools were introduced from mid-1993. Some of lhe new instruments
include open morkel operolions (OMO), discount window, reserve requirements
ond stonding focilities omong others. Due to the lock of direct influence of lhe
instruments on lhe overoll objectives of monetory policy otherwise known os the
ultimole torgets (mocroeconomic growih ond stobility), lhe CBN hos identified
certoin meosuroble voriobles {operoling ond intermediote torgels) through which
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lhe ullimote torgets con be influenced. The CBN directly influences lhe bose
money (reserve money) os the operoling torget lo move the intermediole torgets
like money supply (M2), credil. interest role ond exchonge rote in o desired
direction. Movement ond chonges in the intermediole torgets effectively
influence the ullimote lorgel of high employment, price slobility, vioble bolonce
of poyment ond economic growth.
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lll.2

Monelory Pollcy Fromework under Vorlous Reglme3

The CBN seek olternotive opprooches

to

ond fromeworks in lhe implementotion of

oddress lhe someiimes chonging torgets of
mocroeconomic dynomics. "Long histories of unintended oufcomes ond
dissolisfoctory performonce of monetory policy often compel monetory policy
designers to look olternotive fromeworks" (Okofor, 2009 pg. I ). Some of the
reosons for occosionol oulside iorget performonce of monetory policies hove
been identified os less thon odequole informolion, conflicting workings of the

moneiory policies

meosures or externol shocks which involidotes underlying ossumption of previous

policy meosures. The Nigerio moneiory policy fromework ol the time when
operotions were lorgely by dkect control with focus of exchonge role torgeling
operoted on o short-term bosis. ln olher words, instruments ond lorgets were
odopted within o one-yeor monetory fromework. OMO wos conducted wholly
using Nigerion Treosury Bills during lhis lime until 2001 ond olso involve the
mondotory soles of speciol NTBS lo bonks with requirement of 200 per cenl
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treosury inslruments cover for bonk's foreign exchonge tronsoctions. Mojor focus
of the CBN wos 1o ensure sound monogemenl ond mointenonce of o heollhy
bolonce sheet position for the deposil money bonks (DMBS). According to
Uchendu (2009), mojor problem for the inobility lo meet mosl torgets during this

time could be ottributed lo exponsionory fiscol policies ond lock of coordinotion
of monelory ond fiscol policy implementotion.

to medium-term monelory policy fromework from 2002 to toke
core of the issue of lime inconsistency ond to minimise ihe over-reoclion orising
from temporory shocks. This decision olso followed on the heels of lhe reolisolion
thoi monelory policy octions offect the ultimole objeclives wilh consideroble log.
The CBN moved

Toble 3: Monelory Pollcy Reglmes ond Feolures
Period
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,lAedlum-

term
(2 yeor3)

Monogement, Price

debt Stobility, Bonking

reform

meosures,

sloble inflotion ond
exchonge rote

Consequenily, under ihis present fromework monelory policy guidelines ore open
io holf-yeorly review in the light of developments in monetory ond finonciol
morkef conditions in order to ochieve medium-to-long term gools. The OMO

remoin the primory tool of monetory policy, complemented by reserve
requirement, discount window operotions ond foreign exchonge morkel
intervention wilh the focus of moving inflotion to single digit ond ensuring stoble
exchonge rote. Uchendu (2009). concluded lhot the CBN hos been oble io
ochieve more of porticulorly the sel ullimole torgels over lime due lo vorious prooctive meosures pul in ploce. This hos olso been complemented by improved
fiscol discipline.
new monelory fromework hos been continuolly sirenglhened from 2006 with
the oim of reducing interest rote volotility ond ensuring thoi the money morket
becomes more responsive. Posl consolidolion, ihe moior chollenge for monelory
policy hos been ihe persistence of excess liquidity occounted for mojorly by
increosed privole copitol inflows. To effectively tockle lhis chollenge, lhe
monelory policy slroiegy hos took odditionol form of running down of CBN5
holding of treosury bills, unremuneroted reserve. increosed coordinotion between
monelory ond fiscol oulhorities, occosionol foreign exchonge swop ond
restrucluring of debls into longer tenor debts. A very importont development in
the Nigerio monelory policy fromework is lhe estoblishment of enduring
institulionol onongements which hos over the posl period greolly offecied the
efficiency ond outcome of the process. After 1999. decisions ond implemenJotion
of monetory policy ceosed to be the sole responsibility of CBN's monogemenl.
The Monetory Policy Commiliee (MPC) which includes membership ouiside the
CBN wos estoblished to deliberote on decisions ond outcome of policies while
other commiltees existed in the CBN lo provide support for the MPC. While lhe
committee's perform vorying funclions, they oll ploy o complemeniory role in the
formulolion ond implementolion of monelory policy (CBN 2010).

This
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Oulcome of Monetory Pollcy

lncreosed coordinotion between monetory ond fiscol outhorilies especiolly since
1999 hos provided on environmenl for improved effecliveness of monelory
policy. Prior to this, time fiscol dominonce oflen hompers effeclive
implementotion, leoding lo inobilily to ochieve mosl monetory torgets. Except in
lhe oreo of reol economic growlh ond inflotion role where the divergence
between lorgets ond oulcome hos tended to converge, movements in mojor
moneiory oggregotes hove differed lorgely from torget over time. The reoson for
this hos been skongly ottributed to porticulorly the disconnection between moior
sectors of the economy.

dkecl control period before the odoption of SAP in 1986, which coincided
with o period of relotively underdeveloped money ond copitol morkel wos
chorocterised by sectorol credil ollocolion, credit ceilings ond odminishotive
fixing of exchonge role. However, the bottleneck creoted by the dislortions in the
morket leod lo wide spreod inefficiencies in resource ollocolion ond ulilizolion.
Okofor (2009), noted thol the flow of credit 1o priority sectors during the direct
monetory control ero did not meel the prescribed torget in mosl coses.
Notwilhslonding the foct thol sectorol ollocolion policy requires the bonks to
odvonce credit lo promole the growth of non-oil seclor, including ogricullure
ond monufocturing, the sectors did not witness opprecioble growth. A mojor
foctor lhot undermined the success of monetory poly during this period wos thot
becouse the Federol Ministry of Finonce ployed o moior role, policies were moinly
The

influences by short-term politicol considerotions.

noied, the objectives of monelory policy hove remoined bosicolly lhe
some over time, while monetory oggregole ond inflotion hove olso remoined ihe
intermediote ond ultimote ob.iective respectively. To properly copture chonges in
the economic londscope, oulhorities hove voried lhe conduct ond fromework
for lhe implementotion of monetory policy. Likewise, the outcomes hove been os
voried wilh mosl monelory oggregotes someiimes over-shooting or folling below
their lorgets (toble 3).
As eorlier
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lhe monelory policy hos been operoting remoin
o greol concem to policymokers ond mojor impediment to policy effectiveness.

The circumstonces under which

The gool of promoting employmenl is occosionolly undermined by the enormous
size of lhe informol sector which invoriobly shrinks the sphere of influence of

monetory policy. This creotes huge disconnect between monetory policy,
production ond reol growlh.
There is olso the concern obout ihe chonging behoviour of bonks since the
oftermoth of the contogion effect of the globol finonciol crisis ond especiolly the

humbling offect CBN's intervention/boilouts. Bonks hove simply become
exlremely conservotive {slopped lending to SMEs ond reol sector) electing only to
fortify their books with holdings of high return government bills/popers. This hend
hos been constontly under the scruliny ond x-roy of onolysts who believe lhol
bonks will only venlure to brooden the scope of their loons/ossets porticulorly
lowords the reol seclor when investments in government poper become less
profitoble. These circumslonces underscore the limited potency of the monelory

policy especiolly os

it

offects reol growlh ond by extension employmeni

promolion.

lV.
lV.1

EconomelrlcAnolysls
Dolo ond Vorlobles

oggregole time-series doto os in severol studies on bonk lending
(see Bernonke ond Blinder, (1992); Gertler ond Gilchrist, (1993); ond Koshyop et
ol., (1993). ll is importont to note thot, lhough most of the recent sludies in this
oreo (see Brssimis et ol., 2003; Ehrmonn et ol.. 2003; Gombocorto, 2003; ond
Worms, 2003) hove shifled 10 the use of bonk level doto to oddress the
chollenges of seporoting the demond ond supply effects, lhis study prefers the
oggregole doto given the poucity of bonk level doto in Nigerio.

The study uses

The voriobles employed in lhe study include DMBs' credil to the core privote
seclor (CCPS) defined os credit extended to oll privote firms except privote
finonciol firms. This represents lhe port of lhe oggregote credit io ihe domestic
economy by lhe bonking system given bosed on ihe morket interest roles. lt is ihe
portion of the loons gronied ond known to be mosl sensitive to chonges ond
shocks in the monetory policy. lt is used os one of ihe two voriobles lhot will
copture lhe behoviour of lhe bonks given ony chonges in monetory policy. The
other vorioble is the moximum lending rote which will olso meosure whether
bonks chonge lheir behoviour when the CBN chonges lhe direclion of monetory
policy. The moximum lending rote represents the lending rote of every bonk
including oll chorges, fees ond commissions thol bonowers poy on loons ond
odvonces from commerciol bonks ond thus best reflects the generol pricing
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behoviour of bonks. Given thot the Nigerion moneiory policy regime is lorgely
driven by lhe open morkel operolions guided by ihe MPR, lhe lost vorioble is lhe
MPR which will trock lhe chonges in monelory policy. lt is the indicotive rote for
lhe monetory policy stonce ond represents operoting torget of the monetory
policy fromework.

lV.2

Methodology ond Model Speclffcotlon

eoch endogenous vorioble os o function of ils own logged volues
ond the logged volues of the other voriobles in lhe model, the VAR methodology
ovoids the need lo specify o structurol model which usuolly requires extensive
knowledge of economic lheory behind lhe hypothesis. Although VAR hos been
criticized os o theoreticol, it hos been found 1o be very useful in hocing the
dynomics thol exist omong mocroeconomic voriobles of interesl in terms of
impulses or shocks ond responses 1o such impulses.
By modelling

However, most mocroeconomic voriobles ore known to be non-slotionory ot
level ond os such, o vector error conection (VEC) model which is o restricted VAR
designed for use with non-stotionory series thot ore known lo be co-integroted
moy be used. Wilh co-inlegrotion relotions built into ihe specificotion of the VEC,
it reslricls the long run behoviour of lhe endogenous voriobles io converge io
lheir ccinlegroting relolionships while ollowing for shorl-run odiuslment dynomics
(Eviews, 2009).

ln lhis study, o 3-vorioble VEC is estimoled. Since the lhree voriobles were nol
siotionory ot level ond the .Johonsen co-inlegrolion resulls suggested one cointegroting relotionship, we estimoled o veclor enor coneclion (VEC) model for
lhe three voriobles of credit to privole secior (CCPS), moximum lending role
(MLR) ond monelory policy rote (MPR). The lobles below present lhe test resulls
for order of inlegrotion, iohonsen co-inlegrotion ond vector enor conection.
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Toble 4: Test Results for Order of lntegrollon

Vorioble

Order of

lniegrotion

Probobility

CCPSI

t(t)*

0.0000

2

MtRI

t(tl-

0.m00

3

MPRr

t(l)*

0.00m

Toble l: Test resulls lor Unii Rool Using ADF Test
Note: ' ond " denotes 5 ond I per cent slgnificonce level respeclively
Probobilily is the probqbility of occepling lhe null hypothesis of unit root

Colnl"grqllng
Scenqdot (Iolql GDP

tel)

Equotlon(t) Oroce.
Model

,{qx. Elg.nv.)'

Conclutlon

CCPST. MLRr&

(1.1)

MPRt

Cointegroted

Toble 2: Test Results lor Johonsen Cointegrotion Anolysis

Note: l. Cointegrotion coefficients ore normolized on CCPSr
2. Test wos ot 5% level of significonce

IV.2.l lmpulse Response Anolysls
The study employs the impulse-response onolysis in order 1o study the dynomic
interoctions of lhe voriobles. These functions troce out the effect of o one
stondord deviotion shock to lhe orthogonolized residuols of eoch equolion on
cunent ond fulure volues of the endogenous voriobles in the system. Becouse of
the dynomic structure in which eoch equotion consists of its own logged volues
ond the logged volues of oll the olher endogenous voriobles, o shock in one
vorioble is tronsmitted to oll olher voriobles. The voriobles ore ordered in such o
woy os lo reflecl credit to privoie sector os the mosl endogenous vorioble in the
system. MPR is ossumed to be leost sensilive to contemporoneous innovoiions in
lhe other voriobles. reflecting lhe focl lhol it is predominontly the oulcome of
exogenous decision by the centrol bonk. Other orderings did not chonge the
result quolitotively.

The lmpulse Response Function (lRF) show thol on impulse from the monelory
policy vorioble led to o slight positive effect on the credit thot bonks extend to
the privole secior which fell by the third monlh ond continues to decreose
persistently. A similor shock to the MPR however, shows on initiol slight negolive
effect on the moximum lending rote which quickly chonged to positive ond rose
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significontly ond persistenlly. Expecledly, on innovotion from lhe MPR creoted o
posilive ond permoneni effecl on ilself over lhe time horizon (Figure I ).

1V.2.2 Vodonce Decompo3lllons
is cleor lhot in the given horizon, o significont shore of lhe voriolion
in lhe quontum of credil bonks extend to the core privote seclor is due lo own
innovolions (obove 99 per cenl by the l2rh month) suggesting thot mony other
foctors ore considered by lhe bonks before ollering their lending behovior.
Similorly, voriotion in the MLR is mostly due to ils own innovolions (oboul 75 per
ceni) ond olso to on extent, the movements in the MPR (obout 20 per cent). This
supports lhe foct thol bonks in Nigerio wotch closely ihe movemenl of the
monelory policy onchor os o bosis for lheir own credil pricing.

From loble 3. it

Figule 2: lmpulse Response Funcllons
Responae to Chole3kyon€ s.D. lnno\dlions
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Toble 5: Vorlonce Decomposlllon
Vorionce Decomposition of
Period
I

2
3
4

S.E.
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0.6r 3588
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o.428548
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5
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1 .232251
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9
10

t1
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Concluslon ond Recommendotlons

sludy exomined the bonk lending chonnel of monelory policy in Nigerio. We
conclude thol the bonk lending chonnel operoted os monetory policy
tronsmission mechonism in Nigerio wilh lhe period under review os obtoinoble in
internotionol observed evidence. though wilh significont difference in voriolions
due lo the peculiority of the Nigerio economy. We found thot credit to privote
seclor (loon supply) by the bonking sector is determined lorgely by ils own
logged volue ond behoviour indicoting thol suggesting lhot o lot ol other foctors
ore considered by the bonks before the chonge lheir lending behovior. On the
other hond, though voriotion in the moximum lending rote is moslly due lo ils own
innovolions, over o fiflh of its chonge is determined by chonges ond voriotions in
MPR. This supports the foct thoi bonks in Nigerio olso wolch closely the movement
of the monetory policy role os one of lhe considerolions for their own credit
pricing in oddition to other foclors, porticulorly non-finoncing reloled cost

This
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componenls (including infrostructurol cosl. personnel cost, other cost) lo set lheir
lending rote. By odvoncing the underslonding of how the bonking lending
chonnel of the Nigerion bonking system interocts with the monetory policy of the
monetory oulhority, this poper seeks 1o help improve the notion's monetory policy
formulotion fromework.
outcome of this study indicotes thot for ihe bonk's, o huge quonlum of olher
foctors ore criticol in their price (lending interest rote) fixing process other thon iusl
the monelory policy ond inler-bonk rote - primory cost of fund. Generolly
speoking, o tight monetory policy moy not significontly influence the quonlum
ond direction of credit, however the influence on pricing by commerciol bonks
moy move in some direction os the lrend of movement in the monetory policy
rote. Most importontly, this sludy hos shown thot the monetory outhorily ond
government need to exomine closely olher cost components considered by
commerciol bonks in the pricing process. This will otford the outhority opportunity
lo drive down lhe morgin between the moximum lending role ond the monetory
policy rote.
The
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